carlo68 a écrit:
Pour en revenir au sujet et au monde réel:
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The alternative to acquiescence in the Russian annexation of Crimea would be for the Ukrainian government to try to fight back, either by military means or by pressuring the Russian minority in the rest of the country. That, in turn, would almost inevitably imply a descent into Yugoslav-style civil war — with the strong possibility of sucking in Poland, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the United States.
Les Ukrainiens auraient autant de mal à garder la Crimée que les russophones ou Moscou en auraient à garder Kiev : sauf rapport de forces démesuré, les sols appartiennent aux majorités démographiques.
Il est d'ailleurs navrant d'entendre les Occidentaux contester la Crimée aux Russes, déniant ainsi une "liberté des peuples à disposer d'eux-mêmes" qu'ils entonnent à Kiev.
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The West has no intermediate option between accepting the Russian invasion and full-scale war because it seems inconceivable that Putin would voluntarily withdraw from Crimea.
C'est tout le contraire : les Occidentaux organisent le bras de fer avec des rétorsions économiques et diplomatiques.
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Having grabbed Crimea by force, to give it up now would almost certainly mean the end of Putin’s presidency.
Pfff. En tout cas, le volontarisme de Poutine peut bien l'emporter sur l'insouciance des dirigeants occidentaux.
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The Russian public, not to mention the military and security apparatus, believes almost unanimously that Crimea is “naturally” part of Russia, having been transferred to Ukraine, almost by accident, in 1954.
C'est surtout que la majorité tatare y a été remplacée par des Russes durant la dernière guerre mondiale.
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In fact, many Russians think, rightly or wrongly, that the entire Ukraine “belongs” to them. (The word “u-krainy” in Russian means “at the frontier,” and definitely not “beyond the frontier.”)
Hé hé ! Une marche russe vers Istanbul.
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Putin has created a situation in which the West’s only alternative to accepting the occupation of Crimea as a fait accompli is war.
Je crois au contraire qu'il savait à quelle rétorsions économiques et diplomatiques il s'exposait, et qu'il s'en fiche tant que la Russie n'en souffre pas trop.
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Since a NATO military attack against Russia is as inconceivable as Russia’s withdrawal from Crimea, Putin’s redrawing of the Ukraine’s borders seems bound to prevail.
Pour moi, il est logique qu'il envisage une sécession de l'est de l'Ukraine et son rattachement à la Russie, dans la mesure où ses populations le soutiennent majoritairement.
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The only question now is whether the Ukrainian government will calmly accept the loss of Crimea, or try to retaliate against Russians within its new borders; thereby offering Putin a pretext for invading the rest of the country and precipitating all-out civil war.
Ce n'est pas trop une question. Tout ce que peut espérer le nouveau pouvoir ukrainien, c'est d'une part que la Russie n'ampute pas trop le territoire ukrainien, qu'elle ne déborde pas trop là où les russophones sont minoritaires ; d'autre part, de s'en sortir économiquement avec ce qui reste du pays, qui proclame son indépendance (vis-à-vis des russophones et des Russes) et sa souveraineté chez lui.
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This is the question investors must consider in deciding whether the Ukraine crisis is a Rothschild-style buying opportunity or a last chance to bail out of equities and other risky assets before it is too late.
Bof, il n'y a pas trop de questions à se poser. Il faut spéculer sur le pessimisme médiatique en vendant vite les avoirs russes et ukrainiens avant qu'ils ne baissent trop et en les rachetant vite avant qu'ils ne s'apprécient de nouveau.
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To resolve the confrontation, such a government would probably have to guarantee the official status of the Russian language and preserve Russia’s effective veto over Ukrainian relations with NATO and the European Union.
Même pas, mais pourquoi pas.
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The trouble is that the alternative, a civil war in Ukraine, while far less likely, would have far greater impact on European and global economies, on energy prices and on stock-market prices around the world that are setting record highs.
http://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Guerre_de_Crim%C3%A9eCitation:
In the 1991 and 2003 Iraq wars, for example, investors did well to “buy on the sound of gunfire,” but only after the outcome of the engagement was clear. In 2002, the Standard & Poors 500 index fell by 25 percent during the run-up to war. It only turned decisively in March, when the U.S. attack on Iraq began, gaining 35 percent by the end of the year.
Similarly in 1990 and 1991, it was only six months after Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait, when victory for the U.S.-led forces in Iraq had become inevitable, that equities advanced strongly. They gained 25 percent over the next four months.
Au son du canon, pas
avant.
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A better analogy for the current confrontation may be the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. After a summer of nervous speculation in which stock markets around the world fell by 20 percent, President John F. Kennedy confronted Russian leader Nikita Khrushchev with a nuclear ultimatum to remove Soviet missiles from Cuba. Within a week, Wall Street started rising and ultimately gained almost 30 percent in six months.
But the 1962 rebound only started once it became clear that Khrushchev was backing down and Kennedy had won the war of nerves.
Là, c'était différent : retirer ses billes avant la fin du monde puis les replacer dans la grande compétition de la vie.
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But this time with Russia as the winner .
Conclusion surprenante : perdre (une nouvelle fois) l'Ukraine et conserver la Crimée, est-ce une victoire ? Poutine a-t-il l'air comblé ? J'appelle ça minimiser la casse.